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Reversing the increasing contamination of our environ-
ment is manifestly a matter of fundamental import and
utmost urgency. The late Justice Harlan in Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chemicals Corporation'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corporation the State of Ohio
filed a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint invoking the Su-
preme Court's original iurisdiction. Ohio sought relief against the
Wyandotte Chemicals Corporation and the Dow Chemical Corpora-
tion of Canada, Ltd., praying that defendants be compelled to abate
an alleged nuisance caused by the dumping of mercury into streams
whose course ultimately reached Lake Erie. Although acknowledg-
ing its jurisdiction over the dispute, the Court in its discretion de-
clined to exercise its original jurisdiction because (1) the issues
presented were primarily matters of local law (2) there were a
number of governmental agencies already involved in the specific
polution problems with which the case was concerned, and (3) the
case presented novel and technical factual questions for which res-
olution the Supreme Court claimed no expertise.
The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, in actions where a
state is a party, is based on article III of the Constitution:
The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies ...
between a State and Citizens of another State ... and
between a State. . . and foreign Citizens or Subjects.
2
It is further provided:
In all cases in which a State shall be a Party, the Su-
preme Court shall have original jurisdiction.'
Although the Supreme Court has ruled that these provisions are
self-executing,4 that no enabling legislation is required,5 and that
Congress can neither increase nor diminish the scope of the con-
stitutional grant,6 Congress has seen fit to pass implementing
legislation. Accordingly it is provided:
1. 401 U.S. 493, 505 (1971).
2. U.S. Const. art. 111, § 2, cl. 1.
3. U.S. Const. art. 111, § 2.
4. Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 492 (1854) (dictum).
5. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 332-33 (1816)
(dictum).
6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (dictum).
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The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive juris-
diction of: (1) All controversies between two or more
States;
The Supreme Court shall have original but not. exclusive
jurisdiction of: . . . (3) All actions or proceedings by a
State against the citizens of another State or against
aliens.
7
Thus, where a state properly sues another state, the Supreme Court
is the exclusive forum.8 Conversely, where a state sues a citizen
of another state it may sue alternatively in a state court9 but
may not maintain a diversity of citizenship suit in the federal dis-
trict courts."0 Where a state sues a citizen of another state, the
Court has ruled that it has the discretion to refuse to hear the case
in order to "protect [the] Court from an abuse of the opportunity
to resort to its original jurisdiction in the enforcement by States of
claims against citizens of other States."" It was this discretion that
the court in Wyandotte chose to exercise in declining to invoke its
original jurisdiction.12 In deciding whether it will exercise its orig-
inal jurisdiction, therefore, the Supreme Court first must deter-
mine whether the case before it is a suit between two or more
states. If not, the Court in its discretion will consider these fac-
tors which weigh for and against the exercise of its original juris-
diction. This Comment will analyze the Court's approach to the
exercise of its original jurisdiction in light of Wyandotte and the
three cases dealing with the Supreme Court's original jurisdic-
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a), (b) (1964).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1) (1964).
9. Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511 (1898).
10. A suit by a state against a citizen of another state is not between
citizens of different states so as to fall within the purview of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1964) (the federal diversity provision). See People v. Bruce, 129
F.2d 421 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942); State Highway
Comm'n v. Utah Commr Co., 278 U.S. 194 (1920).
Where there is a federal question the federal district courts may enter-
tain the suit. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 91
(1972) (discussed infra); New Orleans R.R. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135
(1880).
For further cases holding that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court extends to suits by one state against citizens of another see, Texas
v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868); accord, Washington v. Northern
Sec. Co., 185 U.S. 254 (1902); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265,
287 (1887) (dictum).
11. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 19 (1939) (per Hughes,
C.J.). See also Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 464-65, 469-71
(1944) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
12. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971).
tion which followed that decision a year later.13 Particular empha-
sis is placed on (1) clarifying those factors which will influence the
court's determination whether to exercise its original jurisdiction
and (2) charting a course of action and arguments for the environ-
mentally aggrieved state seeking to utilize the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court.
II. OHIO V. WYANDOTTE CHE1ICALS CORPORATION
A. Statement of the Case
Ohio alleged in its complaint that Dow Canada and the Wyan-
dotte Chemicals Corporation dumped mercury into streams the
courses of which ultimately reached Lake Erie, contaminating and
polluting that lake's waters, vegetation, fish and wildlife. The
complaint further alleged that the Dow Chemical Corporation of
America was jointly responsible for the acts of its foreign subsidi-
ary, Dow Canada.1 4
Ohio so1ught (1 a declaration t.hat thp n1leged pollution was
a nuisance, (2) an injunction against the introduction of mercury
into streams whose course reached Lake Erie, (3) a decree requiring
defendants to remove the mercury, and (4) monetary damages for
harm done to Lake Erie, its fish, wildlife and vegetation, and the
citizens and inhabitants of Ohio.'5
B. The Decision
The Supreme Court readily conceded its jurisdiction to hear
the case. "Beyond doubt, [t]he complaint on its face reveals the
existence of a genuine 'case or controversy' between one State and
the citizens of another, as well as a foreign subject."'16 Nor, said
the Court, was the subject matter of the case of such a nature as
to necessarily bar the exercise of the Court's original jurisdiction.
[T]his court has often adjudicated controversies between
States and between a State and citizens of another State
seeking to abate a nuisance that exists in one State yet
produces noxious consequences in another.'
13. These cases are Washington v. General Motors, 406 U.S. 109
(1972); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Vermont v. New
York, 406 U.S. 186 (1972).
14. 401 U.S. at 494.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 496-97.
17. Id. at 497. See New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U.S. 473 (1931)
(New Jersey sued the City of New York for a nuisance caused by the
dumping of large quantities of garbage which subsequently floated in New
Jersey waters and were washed up upon New Jersey beaches); New York
v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) (The State of New York sued the State
of New Jersey and its sewerage commissioners from discharging a large
volume of sewage into the waters of upper New York Bay. New York
alleged that such pollution amounted to a public nuisance which would
result in grave injury to the health, property and commercial welfare of
the people of the State and City of New York); Georgia v. Tennessee Cop-
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Further, the court acknowledged the "time-honored maxim that a
court which has jurisdiction must exercise it.1s However, in light
of "changes in the American legal system and the development of
American society," the Court regarded the view that the court
must adjudicate all disputes over which it has jurisdiction "unten-
able."' 9 Thus, stated Mr. Justice Harlan:
[W]e must recognize "the need [for] the exercise of a
sound discretion in order to protect this Court from an
abuse of the opportunity for original jurisdiction in the
enforcement by the States of claims against citizens of
other States.
20
The court denied Ohio's motion for leave to file a bill of complaint.
21
In so ruling the Court laid particular emphasis on (1) the primary
function of the Supreme Court as an appellate tribunal and the re-
sulting lack of time and judicial machinery with which to resolve
the many technical questions presented by the suit and (2) the
availability of alternative forums in which to resolve the contro-
versy.
1. Supreme Court as Primarily an Appellate Tribunal
In stressing the appellate role of the Court, Mr. Justice Harlan
expressed concern with the Court's already onerous workload as
well as the inappropriate structure of the Court for hearing cases
on original jurisdiction. He recognized that the states have become
increasingly involved in disputes with persons beyond their bor-
ders.22 It would be "anomalous", said Justice Harlan, if the court
per Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (The State of Georgia sued the Tennessee
Copper Company, located in a foreign jurisdiction, to enjoin that company
from discharging, over Georgia territory, noxious fumes which caused and
threatened damage to certain forests and vegetation in Georgia); Missouri
v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (complaint filed), 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (The
State of Missouri sued the State of Illinois and the Sanitary District of
Chicago for the discharge of sewage into the Illinois River which, it was
alleged, poisoned the water supply of the inhabitants of Missouri, and in-
juriously affected that portion of the bed of the Missippi River which
was within Missouri territory).
18. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 496-97 (1971).
See Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821).
19. Id. at 497.
20. Id. at 499 citing Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 19 (1939)
(per Hughes, C.J.). See also Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S.
439, 464-65 (1945) ("The Court in its discretion has withheld the exercise
of its jurisdiction where there has been no want of another suitable forum
to which the cause may be remitted in the interest of convenience, effi-
ciency and justice").
21. Id. at 495.
22. Id. at 497.
were to involve itself in the multitude of local disputes, especially
in light of the development of the states' "long-arm jurisdiction."23
Assuming that the resolution of the controversy depended on the
construction of state nuisance law, the Court stated:
This Court's paramount responsibilities to the national sys-
tem lie almost without exception in the domain of federal
law. As the impact on the social structure of federal com-
mon, statutory, and constitutional law has expanded, our
attention has necessarily been drawn more and more to
such matters. We have no claim to special competence in
dealing with the numerous conflicts between the states
and nonresident individuals that raise no serious issues of
federal law.
24
Justice Harlan further emphasized the awkward posture of the
Supreme Court as a finder of fact and the unfortunate prospect of
the Court's time being spent resolving factual disputes at the ex-
pense of reducing the attention given "to those matters of federal
law and national import.
25
Noting that "the simplest sort of interstate pollution case [is]
an extremely awkward vehicle to manage,"26 the Court sought to
avoid the difficulties encountered by the Supreme Court in prior
interstate pollution cases.27 A number of state and regional agen-
cies were already considering the problem of mercury pollution in
Lake Erie. Thus, said the Court, to decide the issue before it would
be "to settle a small piece of a much larger problem that many...
bodies [were] actively grappling with on a more practical basis. ' 28
23. Id.
[T] he eveloution of this Court's responsibilities in the American le-
gal system has brought matters to a point where such would be
sacrificed, and little gained, by our exercising original jurisdiction
over issues bottomed on local law.
It should be emphasized that the controversy before the Court did not
involve the Court in a trivial local dispute; rather, the dispute before the
court was the very serious problem of mercury contamination which
threatened the "life" of Lake Erie.
24. Id. at 497-98.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 504.
27. Id. at 501. The Court noted that in one such pollution case Mr.
Justice Holmes, in seeking to formulate a general rule in much controver-
sies, saddled the plaintiff with an unusually high standard of proof. Mis-
souri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 520-22 (1906).
Apparently this higher standard of proof has been maintained in all
subsequent original jurisdiction pollution cases. See, e.g., New York v.
New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921).
28. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 502-03 (1971).
Specifically Wyandotte was already enjoined by a circuit court from oper-
ating its mercury cell process without judicial authorization. That com-
pany's recyclying procedure was also under the jurisdiction and close scru-
tiny of the Michigan Water Resources Commission. Dow Canada likewise
was making monthly reports to the Ontario Water Resources Commission.
Ohio and Michigan were both participants in the Lake Erie Enforce-
ment Conference, convened to study the forms and sources of pollution,
including mercury, in Lake Erie. Both this Conference and the Interna-
tional Joint Commission were, according to the Court, seeking concerted
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The Court found the nature of the factual disputes equally "dis-
concerting. '29  The Court expressed grave reservations as to its
ability, using even the most competent special master, to unravel
complex issues concerning the nature and effect of mercury pollu-
tion.3 0
In his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Douglas was not as pessi-
mistic in assessing the potential capabilities of a special master,
noting that very complicated cases had been resolved by masters
in the past.3 1 Justice Douglas also disagreed with the majority to
the extent that he felt the litigation of Wyandotte would involve
many and substantial questions of federal law.
3 2
2. Existence of An Alternative Forum
The Court recognized the two principles underlying the Su-
preme Court's original jurisdiction. First, it was originally thought
that no state should be forced to resort to the tribunals of a foreign
jurisdiction and thereby risk incurring local prejudice in favor of
the party from whom redress was sought.33 Secondly, it was felt
that the Supreme Court, in certain situations, might be the only
available forum competent to exercise jurisdiction over the acts of
non-residents of the aggrieved state.34  These principles, accord-
ing to the Court, were inapplicable to the Wyandotte situation. In
evaluating the feasibility of an Ohio court as the proper forum for




31. Id. at 510-11. See Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929) (The
drainage of Lake Michigan was effected through the efforts of Special Mas-
ter, the Honorable Charles E. Hughes); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963) (The Honorable Simon H. Rifkind directed the apportionment of
the waters of the Colorado River between Arizona and California); Ne-
braska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) (Special Master, the Honorable
Michael J. Dougherty, entered a very complex decree apportioning the
waters of the North Platte River among Colorado, Wyoming and Ne-
braska).
32. Id. at 507-08. The federal laws thought applicable by Mr. Justice
Douglas were as follows: The River and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§ 403 (1960) (forbidding the discharge of refuse into certain waterways);
16 U.S.C. § 665 (1960) (granting to Department of the Interior Officials
the right to prevent the discharge of certain pollutants which adversely
affect wildlife); The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1151
(1970); The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331
(1964); The Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4371 (1970).
33. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289 (1888); Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 475-76 (1793).
34, Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 494, 501 (1971).
resolution of this controversy, Mr. Justice Harlan stated:
The courts of Ohio, under modern principles of the scope
of subject matter and in personam jurisdiction, have a
claim as compelling as any that can be made out for this
court to exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate the instant con-
troversy, and they would decide it under the same law
of nuisance upon which our determination would have to
rest. . . . [I]t is unlikely that we would totally deny
Ohio's competence to act if the allegations made here were
proven true.25
In addition to the potential jurisdiction of the Ohio courts, the
Court noted that the parties were already subject to the jurisdic-
tion of local agencies having the expertise to deal with the prob-
lems of pollution in Lake Erie.3 6 Although the Court stressed the
availability of alternative forums of potential competence under
federal law, the question of whether there actually existed a viable
forum competent to grant Ohio adequate relief was never re-
solved.
As for the local agencies, it was apparently the very failure of
those regulatory bodies to adequately deal with mercury pollution
in Lake Erie which necessitated Ohio's appeal for the exercise of the
Supreme Court's extraordinary power to hear cases originally."
Secondly, although such agencies were constitutionally competent
to hear the case, there is some doubt that under Ohio law there
was a means of obtaining jurisdiction over all of the defendants.A8
35. Id. at 499, citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945); ALI, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (2d), § 18.
36. Id. at 502-03. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
It is significant to note that the Court recognized that the federal dis-
trict could not qualify as an alternative forum:
[T]his particular case cannot be disposed of by transferring it to
an appropriate federal district court since this statute [28 U.S.C.
§ 1251(b) (3)] does not confer jurisdiction on those courts and no
other statutory jurisdictional basis exists. The fact that there is
diversity of citizenship among the parties does not support district
court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the statute does
not deal with cases in which a State is a party. Nor would fed-
eral question jurisdiction exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. So far as
it appears from the present record, an action such as this, if other-
wise cognizable in federal district court, would have to be adjudi-
cated under state law. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58
S. Ct. 817 (1938).
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498-99, n.3 (1971). It
was the existence of federal questions involved in interstate water pollu-
tion cases which led the Court in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, discussed
infra, to recognize federal question jurisdiction in such cases.
37. No mention is made in the Court's opinion of the success of local
and regional pollution control. If, however, the allegations made in Ohio's
motion can be taken as true, as they are for purposes of the motion for
leave to file a bill of complaint, it is fair to assume that such local control
was inadequate.
38. Both Dow Chemical Company and the Wyandotte Chemical Cor-
poration were licensed to do business under Ohio law and therefore their
vulnerability to suit in the Ohio courts was not in dispute. As to the
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Thirdly, assuming that such jurisdiction could have been obtained,
the enforceability of a decree rendered by an Ohio court against
foreign corporations is doubtful.s9
3. Summary
Wyandotte makes clear that, in suits between a state and citi-
zens of another state, the Supreme Court will use discretion in de-
ciding whether to exercise its original jurisdiction. The Court will
refuse to hear a case originally where (1) it would detract
from the Court's appellate responsibilities by embroiling the
Court in difficult findings of fact and issues of state law and
(2) there may exist a constitutionally competent alternative forum.
Because the Court was obviously reluctant to utilize its special
master machinery and because it was not clear that Ohio could
actually find a viable alternative forum, the Wyandotte decision is
a discouraging precedent for environmental activists seeking to
utilize the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
III. THE WYANDOTTE PROGENY
In the Supreme Court term following Wyandotte three more
Dow Chemical Company of Canada, Ltd, the jurisdictional issue was in
quite a different posture.
There is little doubt, as pointed out in the court's opinion, that Dow
Canada had the requisite minimum contacts by which the Ohio courts
could obtain in personam jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
Assuming Ohio could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over Dow Can-
ada, there still is the issue of whether Ohio's long arm statute utilized
its constitutional power to enable jurisdiction over Dow Canada. Not only
does Ohio's statute require minimum contacts with Ohio, it also requires
tortious injury in the state. Ohio R. Civ. P. 4.3 (A) (4) (1971). See also
McHugh v. Prestodial, Inc., 45 Ohio App. 2d 97, 241 N.E.2d 102 (C.P. Ham-
ilton Cty., 1968) (for a general discussion of the statute). Thus if the
alleged pollution does not suffice as "tortious injury" under Ohio law the
Ohio courts would not have jurisdiction over Dow Canada, thereby depriv-
ing the state of the alternative forum which the Supreme Court assured
Ohio did exist.
39. There was nothing before the Court in Wyandotte to indicate
where the Canadian courts stood willing to honor the judgment of an Ohio
court against a Canadian Corporation. This would depend on the elusive
principles of comity, whose application is not readily predictable. See, e.g.,
Von Mehven and Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Sur-
vey and Suggested Approach, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1601 (1968). Secondly,
it is not clear that foreign courts would necessarily give full faith and
credit to a decision rendered by an Ohio court especially in the form of
equitable relief. The weight of authority, however, indicates that a valid
injunction would be enforceable in another state. See Auins and Rosen-
berg, The Full Faith and Credit Clause in the U.S. Constitution: An In-
strument of Federalism, 6 Washburn L.J. 96, 101 (1966).
motions for leave to file a bill of complaint were made in disputes
of ecological significance. The first was Washington v. General Mo-
tors Corporation,40 involving an alleged conspiracy by the major
automobile manufacturers to impede development of automobile
pollution control devices. In the second, Illinois v. City of Milwau-
kee, Wisconsin,41 Illinois sued for damages resulting from the
dumping of raw sewage into Lake Michigan. Finally, in Vermont
v. New York 42 the State of Vermont sued New York and the In-
ternational Paper Company for the pollution of Lake Champlain
through the discharge of pulp and paper-making waste and un-
treated sewage. The following is an analysis of those cases.
A. Washington v. General Motors Corporation
1. Statement of the Case.
Motion for leave to file a bill of complaint was made by 18
states, seeking to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
under Article ii, Section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution.-- These
states sued the four major automobile manufacturers and their
trade association, alleging a consiracy among these defendants to
"restrain the development of motor vehicle air pollution control
equipment. '44 Plaintiffs charged a violation of the federal anti-
trust laws as well as a common law conspiracy in restraint of trade.
The relief sought from defendants was (1) "an accelerated
program of spending, research and development designed to pro-
duce a fully effective pollution control device or devices and/or a
pollution free engine at the earliest possible date," (2) the installa-
tion of "effective pollution control devices in all motor vehicles they
[defendant's] manufactured during the conspiracy and as standard
equipment in all future motor vehicles which they manufacture"
and (3) other appropriate "prophylactic relief. '45 Despite the
fact that this case presented "important questions of vital national
concern" 46 the Court, in an opinion by Wyandotte's lone dissenter,
Mr. Justice Douglas, declined to exercise its original jurisdiction.
2. The Decision
As in Wyandotte, the Court noted that the issues before it were
of major importance47 and that the Court's jurisdiction over the
40. 406 U.S. 109, 111 (1972).
41. Id.
42. 406 U.S. 186 (1972).
43. Thus, the suit was by these states against citizens of another state
with no allegations that this was a suit between two states.
44. 406 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1972).
45. Id. at 112.
46. Id.
47. Id. citing Hearings before the Subcommittee on Air and Water
Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Session
(1967).
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controversy could not "be disputed. '48 The Court again empha-
sized, however:
The breadth of the constitutional grant of this court's orig-
inal jurisdiction dictates that we be able to exercise discre-
tion over the cases we hear under this jurisdictional head,
lest our ability to administer our appellate docket be im-
paired.
49
Mr. Justice Douglas proceeded to a consideration of the rele-
vant factors in the exercise of that discretion, specifically whether
this was a case whose subject matter lent it to original consider-
ation in the Supreme Court and whether there was an appropriate
alternative forum. In discussing these considerations, Mr. Justice
Douglas expressed the view that varying localized pollution toler-
ance levels and standards made a centralized hearing of the case
impractical.5 0 He therefore concluded that the case should be
heard in an appropriate federal district court,51 noting that multi-
district litigation apparently involving the same factual claims had
already been consolidated in the District Court for the General Dis-
trict of California.
52
The fact of consolidation is noteworthy, however, for it contra-
dicts the Court's "need for localization" rationale. Indeed, accord-
ing to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, each com-
plaint of all parties under this action alleged a national conspiracy,
48. 406 U.S. at 112, citing Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S.
439 (1944); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1906).
49. Id. at 1398. It was argued that the sheer number of states seek-
ing to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction was enough for the Court
to grant leave to file. The Court did not find this argument compelling,
however.
Not only was Mr. Justice Douglas' pronouncement of this rule of dis-
cretion supported by the recent Wyandotte precedent and the cases cited
therein, he also had the support of numerous legal writers. See, e.g., H.
HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL SYSTEM, 258-60
(1953); Wood & Reed, The Supreme Court and Interstate Environmental
Quality: Some Notes on the Wyandotte Case, 12 ARiz. L. REV. 691 (1970);
Note, 11 STANFORD L. REV. 665, 664-700 (1959).
50. [G]eophysical characteristics which define local and regional
airsheds are often significant considerations in determining the
steps necessary to abate air pollution [Citations omitted]. Thus
measures which might be adequate to deal with pollution in a city
such as San Francisco, might be grossly inadequate in a city such
as Phoenix, where geographical and meteorological conditions trap
aerosols and partic
406 U.S. at 115-16.
51. Apparently this suit was maintainable in federal district courts
under their federal question jurisdiction. See notes 73-79 discussing Illi-
nois v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, infra.
52. See In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 311 F.
Supp. 1349 (J.P.M.L. 1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1964) (prescribing the req-
uisites necessary for a transfer pursuant to consolidation).
making the "existence, scope, and effect of the alleged conspiracy
. . . common to all actions."' 5  The appropriate remedy appeared
to be the only major variable between the complaining parties.
This factor alone was apparently sufficient for Mr. Justice Doug-
las to abandon the confidence which, in Wyandotte, he placed on
special masters to adequately administer complex remedial
schemes. 54 The key to this case appears to be not that the Su-
preme Court could not resolve this controversy, but rather that it
would not resolve a dispute over which federal district courts had
jurisdiction.
3. Summary and Conclusions
Washington v. General Motors Corporation, therefore, should
not be cited for the proposition that the need for variable reme-
dies among the complaining parties will justify a denial by the
Court to exercise its original jurisdiction. Rather Washington ap-
pears to rest on the propos o nhat where (11 thprr is qvailable
an appropriate alternative forum and (2) the suit is between a state
and a citizen of another state, the Supreme Court will decline to
exercise its original jurisdiction, even in matters of "vital national
importance.
55
B. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
1. Statement of the Case
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,5 Illinois moved to file a bill
of complaint under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
against four cities in Wisconsin, the Sewerage Commission of the
City of Milwaukee, and the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of
the County of Milwaukee. Plaintiff complained of defendants'
pollution of Lake Michigan, alleging that defendants discharged
200 million gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage and other
materials daily in the Milwaukee area alone. Illinois requested that
defendants be compelled by the Court to abate the nuisance. The
Court refused to do so, emphasizing (1) that this was not an action
"between two or more states" and (2) because of the federal
questions involved, there was a viable alternative forum in an ap-
propriate federal district court.
53. Id. at 1350. The court added:
It is manifest that the transfer of all actions to a single district
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings will clearly
promote the just and efficient conduct of this litigation and will
serve the convenience of all parties and their witnesses.
54. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 510-12
(Douglas J. dissenting). See also note 31 supra listing remedies previously
administered by special masters.
55. 406 U.S. at 112.
56. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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2. The Decision
As in Wyandotte and General Motors the Court recognized its
jurisdiction to grant the Illinois motion for leave to file a complaint.
Again, speaking for the majority of the Court, Mr. Justice Douglas
emphasized that the Court's original jurisdiction would be invoked
sparingly. 57 The Court then proceeded to a consideration of the
relevant factors.
a. State versus State
Illinois pressed the claim that the agencies named as defend-
ants were instrumentalities of Wisconsin, and that the suit by Il-
linois was against the State of Wisconsin. Thus, according to plain-
tiff, this was a suit between two states over which the Supreme
Court had exclusive jurisdiction, ruling out the possibility of an al-
ternative forum and mandating the Court's exercise of its original
jurisdiction. 58 Indeed the Court noted that "the actions of public
entities might, under appropriate pleadings, be attributed to a
State so as to warrant a joinder of a State as party defendant."5 9
In so ruling, the Court discussed prior cases heard on the Court's
original jurisdiction which arose in virtually the same context as
the controversy before it. ° Notwithstanding the apparent prece-
57. It has long been this Court's philosophy that "our original
jurisdiction should be invoked sparingly." Utah v. United States,
394 U.S. 89, 95. We construe 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1), as we do
Art. 111, § 2, cl. 2 [allowing original jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court in a suit between a state and citizens of another state], to
honor our original jurisdiction but to make it obligatory only in
appropriate cases.
Id. at 93.
58. Id. at 94. See also U.S. Const. art. 111, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1251
(a)(1) (1964).
59. 406 U.S. at 94.
60. In so noting the Court referred to a case very similar to the one
at bar, Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, in which Missouri invoked the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in an action against Illinois and
the Sanitary District of the City of Chicago, seeking an injunction to re-
strain the discharge of raw sewage into the Mississippi River. In permit-
ting Missouri leave to file a bill of complaint, the Court rejected Illinois'
contention that the Sanitary District was the proper defendant and that
Illinois should not have been made a party. In so ruling the Court empha-
sized that (1) the corporation in question was "a public corporation, whose
existence and operations [were] wholly within the control of the state and
(2) the Sanitary District in effecting the alleged nuisance, acted totally
within the authority under Illinois law. Id. at 242.
In a similar suit the Court stated:
Of this it is sufficient to say that the averments of the bill, quite
undenied, show that the defendant sewerage commissioners consti-
tute such a statutory, corporate agency of the state that their ac-
tion, actual or intended, must be treated as that of the state itself,
and we shall so regard it.
dent in favor of exclusive jurisdiction, the Court held that, because
it was not "mandatory" that Wisconsin be a party defendant to
this action, the suit would not be viewed as one between two
states.6 1 One crucial problem was that Illinois should have named
the State of Wisconsin as a party in its complaint but failed to do
so. The Court implied as much in indicating that "under appropri-
ate pleadings'6 2 Wisconsin could have been properly joined.
It is important to note the Court's apparent willingness to base
its refusal to exercise original jurisdiction on a seemingly technical
point of pleading; in short, because Wisconsin was not named as a
defendant originally, the Court would not permit plaintiffs to sub-
sequently join the state so as to mandate the Court's original juris-
diction.
In crystallizing the distinction to be made between a state and
its political subdivisions and demonstrating why joinder of Wis-
consin was not mandatory, Justice Douglas emphasized that "for
purposes of citizenship, political subdivisions are citizens of their
respective states. "6 It is also weli e-tbali iu LI-dL 4 Ul ,
a state and a citizen of another state is not a suit between citizens
of different states for purposes of diversity of citizenship. 4 Based
on this distinction in the statutory scheme of federal jurisdiction
between states and their political subdivisions, it was concluded
that "the term 'states' as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1) [dealing
with actions between states] should not be read to include their po-
litical subdivisions." 65 This distinction drawn, the case was viewed
as outside the exclusivity of the Supreme Court forum as directed
by the above jurisdictional provision, and within the context of a
suit by a state against a citizen of another state. The Court next
considered the viability of an appropriate alternative forum.
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 302 (1921). See also New Jersey
v. New York, 345 U.S. 369 (1953) (New York City was forcibly joined
as defendant in an action against the State of New York).
61. The emphasis in original jurisdiction cases prior to Illinois was
whether the state was properly joined as a party defendant. By hearing
these cases the Court seemed to recognize that where a state was prop-
erly joined as a defendant in a suit by another state, the suit would be
viewed as one between two states for purposes of original jurisdiction. See
note 58 supra. The Illinois case, therefore, appears to break with precedent
insofar as it emphasizes that joinder must be "mandatory" in order to
make the suit one between two states. This writer is aware of no prior
authority where, in an action before the Court on original jurisdiction, this
"permissive" versus "mandatory" joinder distinction was adopted for pur-
poses of recognizing an alternative forum in which the suit could proceed.
62. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 97 (1972).
63. Id. at 97. See Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U.S. 179, 190 (1933);
Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (Wall.) 118, 122 (1868).
64. Postal Telegraph Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894).
65. The Court emphasized, of course, that although the action was
not between states, that under appropriate circumstances, an action could
be brought originally in the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (b)
(1964) providing that "The Supreme 'Court shall have original jurisdiction
but not exclusive jurisdiction of: (3) all actions or proceedings by a state
against citizens of another state. , . ." Id.
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b. The Alternative Forum
Because diversity of citizenship was unavailable as a basis for
jurisdiction in federal district courts,36 the Court turned its atten-
tion to the issue of federal question jurisdiction. In 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(a) it is provided that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum of value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.
Noting that the existence of the $10,000 jurisdictional amount
was "beyond question",67 the Court considered the main issues: (1)
"whether pollution of interstate or navigable waters creates ac-
tions arising under the 'laws' of the United States within the mean-
ing of § 1331(a)" and (2) whether "§ 1331 (a) includes suits
brought by a state."6  Answering both questions in the affirma-
tive, the Court refused to exercise its original jurisdiction holding
that federal law controlled and that the federal district courts had
jurisdiction over the case. In adopting the reasoning of the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Texas v. Pankeyc9 the Court an-
nounced a solution for the problems which arise where a state with
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $10,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between (1) citi-
zens of different states; (2) citizens of a state, and foreign states
or citizens or subjects thereof; and (3) citizens of different states
and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof are addi-
tional parties.
It has been held that this statute does not permit a state suing a citizen
of another state to invoke diversity jurisdiction. Postal Telegraph Co. v.
Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894). See notes 62 and 63 and accompanying
text supra.
67. 406 U.S. at 98. See generally, Glenwood Light & Water Co. v.
Mutual Light, Heat & Power Co., 239 U.S. 121 (1915); Mississippi & Mis-
souri R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485, 492 (1862); Ronzio v. Denver
& R.G.W.R. Co., 116 F.2d 604, 606 (1940); G. Wright, The Law of Federal
Courts, 117-19 (2d ed. 1970); Note, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1369 (1960).
68. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99 (1972).
69. 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971). The dispute in Pankey concerned
the use by certain New Mexico cattlemen of the pesticide toxaphene
against the infestation of the range caterpillar. The use of the pesticide,
however, would have endangered the game fish in the Canadian River and
threatened the water supply in 11 Texas municipalities. Texas, therefore,
sought an injunction to prevent the use of the pesticide, in the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico. The district court
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, however, reversed recognizing the applicability of federal com-
mon law to the controversy.
relatively vigorous antipollution laws is damaged by pollution from
a neighboring state with less stringent standards.
70
Adhering to the rule of Ames v. Kansas,71 the Court held that
a state could bring an action under § 1331 (a) against another party
who was not a state because the original jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court provided by Art. 111, Section 2, clause 2 of the Consti-
tution is not exclusive in such cases. In similarly concise fashion
the Court ruled that "laws" within the meaning of § 1331 (a) "em-
braced claims founded on federal common law. '72 Having laid
this foundation, the Court, noting the policy and thrust of the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act7 3 ruled, for the first time, that
"it is federal, not state law that in the end controls the pollu-
tion of interstate or navigable waters. '7 4 Mr. Justice Douglas, al-
though critical of the majority in Wyandotte for not recognizing
the substantial federal issues which he felt were involved there,75
distinguished that case from City of Milwaukee, emphasizing "the
preoccupation of [Wyandotte] with public nuisance under Ohio
law, not the federal common law . . . . "7 In so ruling, the Court
quoted the "controlling principle" 77 as stated by Judge Johnson in
Texas v. Pankey:
As the field of federal common law has been given
necessary expansion into matters of federal concern and
relationship (where no applicable federal statute exists, as
there does not here), the ecological rights of a state in
the improper impairment of them from sources outside the
state's own territory, now would and should, we think, be
70. 406 U.S. at 99-101.
71. 111 U.S. 449, 470-72 (1884). In Ames the State of Kansas sued
a number of corporations in its own courts. Defendants in turn removed
the suit to federal court because of the federal rights involved in the case.
In opposing this removal, Kansas took the position that Art. 111, § 2, cl.
2, giving the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in all cases in which a
state was a party, preempted the jurisdiction of lower federal courts in
such actions. Rejecting this contention, the Court held that actions by
states against other parties who are not states, are removable to or main-
tainable in the lower federal courts. It was this rule to which the Court
in City of Milwaukee adhered.
72. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99 (1972). See Romero
v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 393 (1959) (Brennan J., con-
curring and dissenting: "[F]ederal courts have an extensive responsibility
of fashioning rules of substantive law .... These rules are as fully 'laws'
of the United States as if they had been enacted by Congress"). Accord
Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 388 F.2d 609, 611-12 (2d Cir.
1967); Stokes v. Adair, 265 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1959); Master v. Holley,
200 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1952).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 466 (1964).
74. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 102 (1972).
75. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971). See note
32 and accompanying text supra.
76. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 102 n.3. But see Ohio
v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 n.3 (1964) (There the
Court noted the absence of federal question jurisdiction in the federal dis-
trict courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
77. 406 U.S. at 99.
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held to be a matter having basis and standard in federal
common law as so directly constituting a question arising
under the laws of the United States.
78
Therefore, said the Court, where (1) federal law, whether in the
Federal Constitution, treaties or laws, so pervades an area of law
as to make such matters an obvious matter of federal concern
and (2) the laws in question do not specifically provide for resolu-
tion of the controversy before the court, federal common law must
obtain.7 9
In applying this dual pronged test the Court first considered
several federal statutes dealing with interstate water pollution,"
noting increasing congressional concern with the pollution of navi-
gable waters.8 ' Of particular significance to Mr. Justice Douglas
was the Federal Water Pollution Control Act which allows a fed-
eral administrator to formulate water quality standards where the
state fails to act.8 2 The Act further makes provision for "abate-
ment" when certain pollution "endangers the health or welfare of
any persons."8 3  In the event that enumerated abatement proce-
dures prove ineffective the federal administrator is empowered to
request the Attorney General to sue on behalf of the United States
for abatement of the pollution.8 4 The Court's reference to this
remedy was only to demonstrate certain limited federal preemp-
tion in these areas of pollution control; the Court was careful to
make clear that the remedies provided by Congress are not exclu-
sive.85 Thus, where the controversy concerns "air and water in
their ambient or interstate aspects," federal common law applies
and the federal court may fashion its own rule where an appropri-
78. Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir. 1971).
79. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 102-04 (1972). See also
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 457
(1957) (Federal common law is established by the federal courts as to
when the Constitution, treaties and statutes of the United States are silent
as to the resolution of a federal question); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec.
Co,. 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942) (Federal common law arises where the area in
question is not delineated by federal law to the extent necessary).
80. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1551 (1970);
National Environment Policy Act of 1969; 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970); Fish
& Wild Life Act of 1956, 16 U.S.C. § 942(a) (1960); Migratory Marine
Game Fish Act, 16 U.S.C. § 760(c) (1960); Fish & Wildlife Coordination
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 661 (1960).
81. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 102 (1972).
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1964).
83. Id. at § 10(a).
84. Id. at § 10(g).
85. 406 U.S. at 103. Indeed, said the Court "[t]he remedy sought by
Illinois is not within the precise scope of remedies provided by Congress."
ate rule is not provided by statute.8 6
Mr. Justice Douglas rejected the argument that "the applica-
tion of federal common law to abate a public nuisance in inter-
state or navigable waters [was] inconsistent with the Water Pollu-
tion Control Act. 87 Although this Act encouraged state abatement
of water pollution, not to be "displaced by federal enforcement
action," the law did not negate a state's quasi-sovereign right of
protection from nuisance arising outside of its borders.88 The use
of federal common law was further justified by "the need for a
uniform rule of decision" in matters of federal concern.89
In determining the specific principles of federal common law
applicable to the instant controversy, the Court noted its prior
characterization of water pollution as "a public nuisance" against
which a state might properly ask for an injunction, as requested by
the State of Illinois.90 In prescribing the controlling principle to be
utilized by the federal judiciary in developing this "federal com-
mon law of nuisance," the Court stated:
[N] ew federal laws and new federal regulations may in
time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance.
But until that comes to pass, federal courts will be empow-
ered to appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation
of a public nuisance by water pollution. While federal law
governs, consideration of state standards may be relevant. 1
Thus, a state with high water quality standards may well
ask that its strict standards be honored and that it not
be compelled to lower itself to the more degrading stand-
ards of a neighbor. There are no fixed rules that govern;
these will be equity suits in which the informed judqment
of the chancellor [the district court judge] will govern.92
86. Id. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957)
("It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where fed-
eral rights are concerned"); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1972).
Mr. Justice Douglas noted:
While the various federal environmental protection statutes will
not necessarily mark the outer bounds of the federal common law,
they provide useful guidelines in fashioning such rules of decision.
406 U.S. at 103 n.5.
87. Id. at 104.
88. Id. at 104-05. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230,
237 (1907) (Original suit in the Supreme Court against a Tennessee com-
pany whose noxious gases caused wholesale destruction of forests, or-
chards, and crops in Georgia). Accord Hinderlinder v. LaPlata Co., 304
U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (The Court recognized questions of federal common
law involved in the resolution of boundary disputes).
89. 406 U.S. at 105. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 421-27 (1964). Accord Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
90. 406 U.S. at 106-07. See New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296,
313 (1921); New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U.S. 473, 481-82 (1931);
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923); Missouri v. Illinois,
20 U.S. 496, 520-21 (1901).
91. See Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 606, 670 (1923); Kansas
v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146-47 (1901).
92. 406 U.S. at 107-08 (emphasis supplied; citations omitted),
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In short, the district courts will have wide discretion in interstate
water pollution cases to draw from state and federal law and to
fashion remedies best suited for resolution of the controversy be-
fore it.
3. Summary
The first major proposition to be derived from City of Milwau-
kee is that, where a plaintiff-state seeks to invoke the mandatory
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by suing a sister state,
the plaintiff-state must name the defendant state in the complaint;
if the defendant-state is not so named, that state's subsequent
joinder cannot be a basis of original jurisdiction unless such join-
der is "mandatory." Further, if the original defendants have other
available means into federal district court (i.e. through federal
question jurisdiction), the joinder of the state party will not be
deemed "mandatory" and the jurisdictional distinction between
the state and the original defendant will control.
The second major proposition announced in City of Milwaukee
is that in suits by a state against citizens of other states for pollu-
tion of interstate waters, federal question jurisdiction will be rec-
ognized in the federal district courts. In resolving such disputes,
where the federal statutory law provides no specific solution to
the problem the district courts will apply the federal common law
of nuisance. In so ruling, the Court further narrowed the avail-
ability of the Supreme Court as an original forum for the resolu-
tion of environmental disputes. The decision should be a source
of encouragement to environmentalists, however, for it provides
for the first time a neutral forum, the federal district courts, and
uniform law, the federal common law, applicable to interstate wa-
ter pollution cases.
C. Vermont v. New York.
In Vermont v. New York 93 the Supreme Court granted Ver-
mont's motion for leave to file a complaint invoking the original
jurisdiction of the Court in a suit against New York and Interna-
tional Paper Company 4 In granting Vermont's motion, the Court
93. 406 U.S. 186 (1972).
94. The text of the entire opinion is as follows:
PER CURIAM.
April 24, 1972. The motion by Vermont for leave to file a
complaint invoking our original jurisdiction against New York and
against International Paper Company, a New York corporation do-
ing business in New York, is granted. New York and Interna-
wrote no opinion, leaving the precedential significance of that deci-
sion a matter of deduction. The following discussion, therefore, is
an analysis of Vermont v. New York based on the complaint, the
briefs filed by all parties, and a comparison of that case to the three
recent cases already discussed in which the Court declined to exer-
cise its original jurisdiction.
1. Statement of the Case
The State of Vermont, "acting for itself, and in its quasi-sover-
eign capacity, and as parens patriae for its citizens and inhabi-
tants,"9  sought" to sue the State of New York and International
Paper Company, doing business under the laws of New York,
97
for alleged nuisance and trespass in connection with discharges
from International's pulp and paper plant. The complaint alleged
that International Paper Company discharged pulp and paper-
making wastes in Ticonderoga Creek and that a large "sludge" bed
of "wood chips, cinders and organic material" had formed in Ticon-
deroga Creek and at its conflu enee with Lake Champlain.9 8 Ver-
mont claimed that this bed polluted the waters of Lake Champlain,
that "noxious and nauseous odors" carried into Vermont, adversely
affecting Vermont citizens, and that portions of the sludge bed
floated into Vermont waters and against the Vermont shoreline,
creating a "trespass and a public nuisance."'9 9
The wrong alleged to have been committed by the State of
New York was not the discharge of contaminating matter into Lake
,Champlain. Rather, the alleged misconduct of New York was the
breach of its claimed duty "[a] s the owner and exclusive regulator
of [its] lands and waters" "to use and manage them in such a man-
ner as not to injure the property of others."'00 New York, accord-
ing to the complaint, permitted the discharges by International
Paper Company and refused to remove or confine the sludge
bed.1 1 Vermont alleged that the defendants' actions injured the




95. Complaint par. 1 at 4.
96. Via a motion to file a bill of complaint invoking the Court's origi-
nal jurisdiction.
97. Defendant International Paper Comrany is a corroration do-
ing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New
York and has its principal office at New York, New York.
Comlaint par. III at 4.
98. Id. at par. XIII-XIX at 5-6. Vermont was careful to characterize
Lake Champlain as a "navigable," "interstate" and "boundary" water. Id.
par. vi at 4. For purvoses of standing Vermont also alleged that it was
legal owner of the Lake and the lands thereunder to the channels deepest
point, which was the boundary between Vermont and New York. Id. pars.
VII at 4.
99. Id. par. XXIII-XXV at 7-8.
100. Id. pars. XI at 5.
101. Id. pars. XVI, XXII at 6, 7.
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ecology of Lake Champlain, adversely affected business and prop-
erty values "of the citizens and inhabitants" of Vermont, and dam-
aged Vermont's tourist and recreation industry.' 0 2 Although Ver-
mont also sought redress for alleged deprivation of federal and
state constitutional rights,108 the gravamen of the complaint was
in nuisance and trespass.
0 4
Vermont sought a decree directing that the alleged nuisance
be abated, that New York and International Paper Company be re-
quired to remove the sludge and to restore the navigability of
the waters of Lake Champlain, and that International Paper Com-
pany be enjoined from further discharges from its Ticonderoga
plant.10 5 Additionally, Vermont sought compensatory damages and
punitive damages of an unspecified amount "for the wilful, inten-
tional, reckless and wanton conduct of such defendants."'0 0
2. The Arguments
a. Justiciability of the Controversy
International Paper Company and New York took the position
that New York could not be sued and therefore should not have
been joined. 07 Defendants contended:
[The] claim against the State of New York of alleged mal-
administration of its own laws-in effect a difference of
opinion between Vermont and New York as to New York's
quasi-sovereign actions in permitting International Paper
Company to continue its operations within New York
State-is not a justiciable controversy between states and
therefore does not constitute a matter of which this Court
102. Id. pars. XXX-XXXIII at 8-9.
103. Id. pars. XXI, XXVIII at 6, 8.
104. Id. pars. XXII, XXV, XXXI at 7, 8. The substance of the harm
complained of by Vermont as set forth in paragraph XXXIII of the com-
plaint was as follows:
The aforesaid actions by Defendants have damaged the Ver-
mont waters of Lake Champlain as a common fishery and a place
for sport, recreation and relaxation and have caused and will con-
tinue to cause great and substantial economic losses to the tourist
and recreation industry of the State of Vermont and its citizens
and inhabitants.
Id. at 9.
105. Id. par. XXXV at 9-10.
106. Id.
107. As discussed earlier, in suits between states the Supreme Court
has original and exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, if New York was properly
named as co-defendant there would exist no alternative forum to which
the Court might defer. See notes 8-11 and accompanying text supra.
Thus, both defendants rigorously challenged the propriety of New York's
presence in this litigation in an effort to put the suit in the context of
a suit by a state against a citizen of another state, thereby enhancing the
Court's discretion to deny Vermont's motion to file its complaint. See
notes 9-11 supra.
would have exclusive jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)
(1) [concerning suits between two or more states], 0s
Defendants took the position that, according to the complaint, New
York was guilty of no tortious conduct because it was Interna-
tional Paper Company which allegedly made the discharges which
contributed to the sludge deposits in Lake Champlain. 10 9
In support of the contention that the claim against New York
lacked justiciability,10 it was urged that the maladministration of
one state's laws cannot give rise to a cause of action by a neigh-
boring state."' Further, in contending that "it must be shown that
New York [was] itself or by its instrumentality actively contribut-
ing to the alleged nuisance or trespass," defendants stressed that
the fact of International Paper Company's incorporation under
New York law was not a sufficient nexus between the defendants
to attribute International's actions to the state.
12
In rebutting this argument, Vermont emphasized that Vermont
and New York are "abutting landowners, each owning the soil un-
der the waters of Lake Champlain from its respective shore line to
the interstate boundary.""8  "Each state," according to Vermont,
"owns the land in its sovereign capacity as a representative of and
in trust for the people of the state."'' 44 The wrong by New York
which, according to Vermont, supported justiciability, was New
York's knowingly keeping a nuisance on its land with resulting
injury to Vermont. Said Vermont:
108. Brief of International Paper Company in Opposition to Vermont's
Motion for Leave to File Complaint [hereinafter referred to as Brief of
International Paper] at 11. See also Brief [of New York] in Opposition
to Motion for Leave to File Complaint [hereinafter referred to as Brief
of New York] where it is stated:
At most, [Vermont's] complaint asserts that New York has failed
to prosecute International Paper with sufficient vigor and has





111. See Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 22 (1900) ("[S]omething more
must be put forward than that the citizens of one state are injured by
the maladministration of the laws of another.")
112. Brief of International Paper at 13. This view is soundly sup-
ported by precedent. In Missouri v. Illinois and the Sanitary District of
Chicago, 180 U.S. 208 (1908) the Court noted, in taking jurisdiction of an
action against Illinois for the torts of the Sanitary District of Chicago, that
the District was:
... not a private corporation, formed for purposes of private gain,
but a public corporation, whose existence and operations are
wholly within the control of the state.
Id. at 242. See also Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 18 (1939) ("Mis-
souri cannot be brought into court by the expedient of making citizens
parties to a suit otherwise not maintainable against the state").
113. Supplemental Brief of the State of Vermont in Support of Motion,
for Leave to File Complaint [hereinafter referred to as Supplemental
Brief of Vermont] at 6.
114. Id. citing Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 406, 39 N.E. 400, 402 (1895);
In re Lake Seymor, 117 Vt. 367, 375, 91 A.2d 813, 826 (1952).
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There is no question but that the keeping of a nuisance
on one's land is actionable if it does harm to the neighbor-
ing land.
New York, as an abutting landowner, is responsible for
damages done as a result of the existence of the nuisance
on its property once it has been given notice and has failed
to abate. This proposition is well grounded in our common
law.115
Further, according to Vermont, the sludge on the floor of Lake
:Champlain constituted a continuing trespass on Vermont's prop-
erty.
116
As outlined by Vermont, this action sounded in private rather
than public nuisance; this was a dispute between abutting land-
owners for the nuisance of one owner in the use of his property.
1 17
Because City of Milwaukee was argued the same day as Vermont,
plaintiff in the instant case did not have the benefit of that prece-
dent to support its claim. It is important to note, however, that in
City of Milwaukee the Court also characterized the wrong there
as sounding in the law of private rather than public nuisance.", s
By way of hindsight, City of Milwaukee would seem to support
Vermont's characterization of its claim.
b. Existence of an Alternative Forum
Both the International Paper Company and the State of New
York contended that there existed a viable alternative forum which
negated the need for and desirability of the Supreme Court's or-
iginal jurisdiction. 1 9 In support of this contention, defendants em-
phasized Zahn v. International Paper Company,1 20 a pending class
115. Supplemental Brief, supra note 113, at 7.
116. Id. at 8, citing Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926).
Vermont also alleged that New York's action, in letting the sludge redefine
the deepest part of the channel of Lake Champlain, altered the boundary
of each state. In this manner Vermont made a weak attempt to charac-
terize this suit as involving a boundary dispute so as to utilize past cases
in which the court invoked its original jurisdiction to resolve boundary
disputes between states. See, e.g., Michigan v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 295
(1926); Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65 (1926). As discussed,
however, the gravamen of this suit was trespass and nuisance and not the
alteration of state boundaries.
117. See Restatement of Torts § 822 (1939).
118. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 104-06 (1972). See also
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Restatement
(Second) of Torts, Explanatory Notes ch. 7, 255 and ch. 40, 216-17 (1965).
119. Brief of International Paper Company at 22; Brief of New York
at 14.
120. Docket No. 6192 (D. Vt. 1972).
action brought against International Paper Company by and for
"Lake Champlain lakeshore landowners and lakeshore lessees."
Noting that the suit was for an injunction as well as punitive
and compensatory damages, defendant argued that it was "point-
less for two courts to litigate the same state of facts and the same
issues. '121 International Paper Company further contended that it
could be sued in the courts of Vermont 122 or in the Supreme Court
of New York. 128 Also available, claimed International Paper, were
the various administrative bodies which were active in ecological
matters affecting Lake Champlain.
The viability of these suggested alternative forums, however,
assumed either that there was no cause of action against the State
of New York, as already discussed, or that New York could be sued
in these suggested forums. Vermont correctly contended that, if
this was a justiciable controversy between two states, the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court was exclusive.2 4 Said Vermont:
This being the case Vermont has no other forum be-
fore which it may litigate its controversy with ...ew York.
There are no long arm statutes which would subject the
State of New York to the jurisdiction of the Vermont
courts.
2 5
In essence Vermont's position was that, where there is a justiciable
controversy between two states, the alternative forum rationale
for denial of the Court's original jurisdiction is inapposite.
c. Wyandotte as a Bar
Relying heavily on Wyandotte, the defendants' position was
as follows:
Even assuming arguendo that the complaint presents
a justiciable controversy, the factual, technical and scien-
tific complexities of this case, and the prospect of many
years of administration or enforcement by this Court of
any decree rendered against the defendants, make this an
inappropriate case for the exercise of original jurisdiction.
In making this argument, defendants emphasized: (1) the sub-
stantial factual dispute as to whether the bottom deposits injured
the ecology of Lake Champlain; (2) the uncertainty as to the extent
of International Paper's responsibility for these deposits; (3) the
121. Brief of New York at 15, citing Arkansas v. Texas, 346 U.S. 368,
371 (1953); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1944).
122. See Village of Bennington v. Hawles, 1OlD Vt. 37 (1926); Bourke
v. Alcott Water Co., 84 Vt. 121, 78 A. 715 (1911).
123. Brief of International Paper Company at 24. Such administrative
bodies which had been involved in attempting to find a solution to the
ecological problems of Lake Champlain included the Federal Water Poflu-
tion Control Administration, the New York State Conservation Department
and the New York Department of Environmental Conservation. Id. at 8-9.
124. U.S. Const. art. 111, § 2, el. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1964).
125. Supplement Brief of Vermont at 9. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem-
icals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 505 (1971) (acknowledging the lack of expertise
of Supreme Court justices to resolve technical and complex issues of fact).
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unresolved question of whether removal of the sludge bed from
the bed of the Lake would do further ecological harm; (4) the
complexities of issuing and enforcing a mandatory injunction; and
(5) the technological expertise required to determine how the qual-
ity of the water might be restored.
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Vermont disputed this contention rather mildly, stating only
that "[t]here seems to be little factual dispute over the fact that
the sludge bed is in the bottom of Lake Champlain and is causing
injury to the Lake."'' Vermont's main contention, however, was
that Wyandotte was inapplicable to justiciable controversies be-
tween states because of the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction
over such matters.
d. Summary
To reiterate, the defendants contended that New York was not
a proper party to this suit because there existed no justiciable con-
troversy between Vermont and New York. Further, defendants
argued that this suit would detract from the appellate function of
the Court and that the Court's original jurisdiction should not be
exercised because of the availability of viable alternative forums.
Vermont's position in essence was that, where a justiciable contro-
versy exists between two states, the Supreme Court must exercise
its original jurisdiction. In this context, said Vermont, there can
exist no alternative forum and policy considerations as to the prac-
tical problems in resolving the dispute are irrelevant.
By granting Vermont's motion and exercising its original ju-
risdiction, the Court adopted at least one of Vermont's arguments.
Because the Court, in so acting, wrote no opinion, it remains for
this writer to deduce the proposition or propositions for which
this case stands.
3. The Precedential Significance of Vermont v. New York.
Vermont v. New York, Washington v. General Motors, and Illi-
nois v. City of Milwaukee were all argued the same day and just
after the Wyandotte decision. The parties in Vermont, therefore,
were without the benefit of the Court's opinions in General Motors
and City of Milwaukee in constructing their arguments. Based on
those decisions as well as Wyandotte it is possible, to a great ex-
tent, to eliminate enough of the plaintiff's contentions in Ver-
126. Brief of International Paper at 19-21.
127. Supplemental Brief of Vermont at 9.
mont to decipher the meaning of the Court's decision to exercise its
original jurisdiction.
Vermont argued that there were no substantial issues of fact
involved in the resolution of the controversy. It is doubtful, how-
ever, that the Court decided to hear the case based on that conten-
tion. As discussed above, 28 there were serious and crucial points
of factual contention concerning (1) the proper means of dealing
with the sludge bed, (2) causation, and (3) remedy. These factual
disputes were at least as complicated as the problem of mercury
pollution involved in Wyandotte.12 In Washington v. General Mo-
tors the only crucial factual dispute was the question of remedy.130
Yet, in Washington, Mr. Justice Douglas stressed that the resolu-
tion of even that narrow issue would detract from the appellate
nature of the Supreme Court; the Court therefore declined to ex-
ercise its original jurisdiction. 13 ' In light of this precedent it ap-
pears that the Court would have declined to exercise its original jur-
isdiction if it viewed as crucial to this case the issue of whether this
matter would embrol the Court in complex factual determination
detracting from the Court's appellate function. The Court having
exercised its original jurisdiction, we must look elsewhere for the
basis of the Court's decision.
It is equally doubtful that the Court rested its decision on a
finding that International Paper could not have been sued in an
alternative forum. As in Washington v. General Motors, there was
already an action against the private party to the suit pending in
federal district court.'3 2  In addition, the decision in Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee that interstate pollution involves federal ques-
itons further indicates the availability of an alternative forum in
which Vermont could have sued International Paper Company.1
3 3
Finally, a basis for the refusal of the Court to exercise its original
jurisdiction in Wyandotte was the existence of various administra-
tive bodies and state tribunals by which the dispute might have
been resolved. 34 So, too, in Vermont there existed such alterna-
tive means for resolution of the dispute with regard to Interna-
tional Paper. Therefore, if the crucial issue in Vermont was
whether there was an alternative forum in which to sue Interna-
tional Paper, it is submitted that the Court could have found such
a forum and therefore would have declined to exercise its original
jurisdiction. Instead, the Court exercised that jurisdiction.
128. See notes 126-127 and accompanying text supra.
129. See notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra.
130. See notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra.
131. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
132. See notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra. Washington v. Gen-
eral Motors is distinguishable from Vermont in this respect to the extent
that in the instant case all of the plaintiffs were not represented in the
district court case wherein the Washington v. General Motors they were.
133. See notes 73-79 and accompanying text supra.
134. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
Quest for Environmental Protection
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The only remaining point of distinction was the presence of
New York in this suit. In Wyandotte and Washington v. General
Motors the defendants were private corporations. In City of Mil-
waukee, it will be remembered, the Court would not permit the
joining of Wisconsin in the action where that state had not been
originally named in the complaint and where such joinder was not
mandatory.18 5 By contrast, in Vermont, the State of New York was
named in the complaint and affirmative misconduct by New York
was among Vermont's allegations. Having eliminated the other is-
sues raised as a basis for the Court's granting of Vermont's motion
for leave to file a bill of complaint, the fact that New York was
properly named as a party seems the only feasible basis for the
Court's decision in Vermont. It is presumable, therefore, that the
Supreme Court recognized the justiciability of Vermont's claim
against New York and that, therefore, this dispute was deemed
within the Court's original and exclusive jurisdiction.
Subject, of course, to the qualification that the conclusions
herein reached are without the benefit of an opinion by the Court
and based solely on pronouncements by the Court in recent deci-
sions, the Court's decision in Vermont v. New York, it is submitted,
stands for the following propositions: (1) Where a state sues an-
other state and alleges facts which constitute a justiciable contro-
versy, the Court will recognize the exclusivity of its original juris-
diction and exercise that jurisdiction without regard to whether
that matter involves complex issues of fact which might detract
from the appellate nature of the Court; and (2) In interstate pollu-
iton disputes a suit by one state against another is justiciable where
the defendant state has knowingly allowed a "nuisance" to exist on
its land and such nuisance has injured the complaining neighbor
state.
IV. SUIMMARY AND SUGGESTED APPROACH
The message of Wyandotte, General Motors, and City of Mil-
waukee is clear; where a state sues a citizen of another state the
Supreme Court will exercise its discretion to invoke its original jur-
isdiction sparingly.136 Seeking to preserve the Court as primarily
an appellate tribunal, Wyandotte makes it clear that the Court will
not hear a case, even of important national scope, if there may ex-
ist a constitutionally competent alternative forum.187 It will be
remembered that in Wyandotte it was not clear that the courts of
135. See notes 57-64 and accompanying text supra.
136. See notes 19-25 and accompanying text supra.
137. See notes 33-36 and accompanying text supra.
Ohio could get jurisdiction under that state's existing long arm
statute, over all named defendants, a factor which undermined the
view that a viable alternative must actually exist.1 8 This as-
pect of Wyandotte was a source of discouragement to environ-
mental activists. That discouragement, however, was somewhat
mollified by the decisions in General Motors and City of Mil-
waukee wherein the Court dismissed plaintiff's motion only after
determining the actual existence of a viable forum other than the
Supreme Court. In General Motors such a determination was rela-
tively easy because the action had already been consolidated in a
California district court.1 9 The alternative forum in which to re-
solve the City of Milwaukee dispute was recognized by ruling
that, in interstate water pollution cases of substantial national con-
cern, federal question jurisdiction will exist in the federal district
courts. 1 40 In resolving such disputes, said the Court, where the
federal law provides no specific solution to the problem, the dis-
trict courts should apply the federal common law of nuisance.' 4 '
Where the suit, according to plaintiff, is between two states,
the rule of City of Milwaukee is that joinder of a defendant state
after the motion is filed will not be permitted unless such joinder
is "mandatory.'1 42 Joinder will not be deemed mandatory merely
because the named defendant is a political subdivision of the
claimed defendant state.143 Nor is it sufficient for joinder that the
state is the locus of incorporation for a defendant private corpora-
tion. 44 It is the author's view that the Court's action in Vermont
v. New York supports the proposition that, where a state properly
sues a sister state alleging facts which, if true, establish a justici-
able controversy, the Supreme Court will recognize the exclusiv-
ity of its original jurisdiction and hear the case originally. 145 Fur-
ther, it is the author's opinion that under Vermont v. New York
all a state need allege to meet the test of justiciability is that the
defendant state has knowingly allowed a "nuisance" to exist on its
land and that such nuisance has injured the complaining state.146
The precedential significance of these decisions in mind, the
author suggests the following approach to an environmentally ag-
grieved state considering the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as a means to resolution of an ecological dispute.
The first consideration is obvious, i.e. whether the Supreme
Court is the most appropriate and advantageous forum for resolu-
138. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
139. See notes 50-51 and accompanying text supra.
140. See notes 65-85 and accompanying text supra.
141. See notes 86-92 and accompanying text supra.
142. See notes 57-64 and accompanying text supra.
143. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
144. See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
145. See notes 128-134 and accompanying text supra,
146. Id.
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tion of the dispute. Resort to this extraordinary procedure might
prove necessary, as in Wyandotte and City of Milwaukee, where
local and regional agencies do not have the resources or the juris-
diction to resolve the problems of which the aggrieved state com-
plains. Indeed, if the Court would exercise its original jurisdic-
tion, such a procedure would probably prove enormously expedi-
tious to the extent that: (1) the special master could make findings
of fact as quickly as possible; (2) decisions of law would be final,
without the possibility of time-consuming appellate proceedings;
and (3) legal decisions by the Court would provide uniform stand-
ards for future cases and avoid uncertainty in the evolution of ap-
propriate legal principles among the lower federal courts.
The machinery of the Supreme Court in original jurisdiction
cases may prove inappropriate or undesirable, however, where (1)
the problem demands close scrutiny and ongoing localized supervi-
sion or (2) the problem involves factual determinations of such a
complex nature that the technical expertise of either a special mas-
ter or the Court would be inadequate. Further, it will be remem-
bered, because of the extraordinay nature of the Court's original
jurisdiction, plaintiffs in such action have been held to an artifi-
cially high burden of proof.
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Assuming the desirability of suing originally in the Supreme
Court, the environmentally aggrieved state should, to the extent
possible, characterize its suit as against the state from within
whose borders the pollution originates. If this effort is success-
ful the Court's jurisdiction will be exclusive and, if a justiciable
controversy is established, the Court will hear the case originally.
Plaintiff in such a case must establish a substantial nexus be-
tween the named defendant state and the wrongdoing; it is not
sufficient that the wrongdoer is a political subdivision of the de-
fendant state or that the wrongdoing corporation is incorporated
under the laws of the defendant state, 148 unless the wrongdoer is
a public corporation.149 Based on Vermont v. New York, however,
the allegation that the defendant state as owner of state lands know-
ingly allowed a nuisance to continue on its property should suffice
if the complaining state can establish the injury caused to it
thereby.1 0
If there is stated no justiciable controversy between two or
more states, the Wyandotte, General Motors and City of Milwaukee
147. See note 27.
148. See notes 143, 144.
149. Id.
150. See notes 128-134 and accompanying text supra.
decisions tell us that there is little chance of the Supreme Court ex-
ercising its original jurisdiction. Based on these cases, however,
and assuming that the Court might, in an extraordinary case, exer-
cise its original jurisdiction in such a context, the aggrieved state
should, if possible, establish the following factors in urging the
court to hear the case originally:
(1) The matter in issue is of primary national importance.151
(2) The case does not involve complex issues of fact beyond
the expertise of Supreme Court Justices or special masters.
(3) Local remedies through administrative bodies are unavail-
able or have been exhausted and have failed.1
5 2
(4) The aggrieved state does not have a long arm statute suf-
ficient to obtain jurisdiction or effect a remedy against de-
fendant.
153
(5) This matter does not involve a federal question over which
the federal courts have federal question jurisdiction.
(6) The controversy is one for which a uniform rule of law is
especially needed.
If these factors could be established the three recent decisions in
which the Court declined to invoke its original jurisdiction would
be distinguished. Unfortunately, however, the establishment of
one of these factors is very likely to mean the contradiction of
another. For example, it may be difficult to argue the existence
of a serious issue of national importance (factor 1) for which there
is needed a uniform rule of law (factor 6) and still be able to
claim that there is not a federal question involved (factor 5). Fur-
ther, it may prove contradictory to argue the simplicity of the
factual determinations involved in the dispute (factor 2) and si-
multaneously argue the failure of local regulatory agencies (factor
3) where, for example, the agency's failure is due to very compli-
cated issues of fact which do demand considerable expertise. Fi-
nally, it may be anomalous for an aggrieved state to argue that its
long arm statute is inadequate for it to obtain jurisdiction over the
defendant due to defendant's insufficient contacts with the state
151. The Court will not take original jurisdiction of essentially local
controversies of limited national importance. The Court in both Wyan-
dotte and General Motors specifically recognized the importance of the
controversies before it. See quote at note 1. See also note 46 and accom-
panying text supra.
152. It will be remembered that this allegation was unsuccessful in
Wyandotte and City of Milwaukee. Nevertheless, the allegation should be
made to demonstrate plaintiff's good faith in seeking to invoke the Court's
original jurisdiction and to convince the Court that a viable alternative
forum does not exist in the form of local regulatory bodies.
153. This allegation is included where possible to rebut the argument
that an alternative forum exists in the court system of the aggrieved state.
Failure to rebut this argument was a substantial factor in Wyandotte. See
note 35 and accompanying text supra.
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(factor 4) and, at the same time, argue the serious nature of the
injury to the state resulting from defendant's wrongdoing.
Unless the action can be properly characterized as a suit be-
tween two or more states, an aggrieved state party can properly
presume the unavailability of the Supreme Court as an original
forum. A state suing a citizen of another state will have the usu-
ally insuperable task of distinguishing Wyandotte, General Motors
and City of Milwaukee, a task necessitating a contradictory argu-
ment to a Court which does not want to be convinced.
